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Abstract- This paper proposes an enhancement to an ex-
isting reputation method for indicating and avoiding ma-
licious hosts in wireless ad hoc networks. The proposed
method combines a simple reputation scheme with a re-
inforcement learning technique called the on-policy Monte
Carlo method where each mobile host distributedly learns a
good policy for selecting neighboring nodes in a path search.
Simulation results show that the reputation scheme com-
bined with the reinforcement learning can achieve up to 89%
and 29% increase in throughput over the reputation only
scheme for the static and dynamic topology case, respec-
tively.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless ad hoc networks, each host has a limited
transmission range. Successful delivery of packets between
hosts outside transmission range of each other therefore
relies on cooperation of intermediate nodes. The funda-
mental assumption for such networks is that the nodes will
cooperate and not misbehave. However, hosts join the net-
work on the fly creating a dynamic topology network. The
lack of a centralized network management leads ad hoc net-
works vulnerable to attacks by misbehaving nodes. Conse-
quently, packets are dropped or even misdirected therefore
resulting in low network throughput. Figure 1 illustrates
an ad hoc network which contains malicious nodes in the
shortest paths (that is, via nodes 10 or 5 and 6). With
some quantification of node misbehavior, malicious nodes
can be identified and the source node is able to send pack-
ets along an alternative path (that is, via nodes 1, 2, 3 and
4).
Recently, reputation schemes have been employed to
identify and avoid malicious nodes [1]-[6]. The reputation
of a node is a function of only the number of data pack-
ets that have been previously relayed by the node. Hence,
nodes have high reputation when they successfully forward
packets they receive. If the nodes have low reputation, it
is subsequently weeded out from the ad hoc network. Rep-
utation is an average of recommendations received by a
node. Suppose node A receives 100 packets and routed 60
packets but dropped 40 packets. Hence total reputation
of node A becomes (60 - 40) /100 = 0.2. Reputation val-
ues vary probabilistically depending on the traffic load and
behavior of nodes themselves.
The outstanding features of reputation schemes include
i) circumvention of malicious nodes, ii) promotion of coop-
eration among nodes, iii) decentralized collection and stor-
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Fig. 1. An ad hoc network with malicious nodes.
age of reputations and iv) subsequently increase in the aver-
age throughput of the ad hoc network [1], [3], [5]. However,
many of these works employ threshold reputation which is
the minimum acceptable reputation a certain node must
possess in order to be selected as the next hop node.
The work in [2], [4] propose fixed-threshold reputation
schemes for identifying trustworthy routers and relays. The
work of [6] also studied reputation schemes with a fixed
threshold for peer-to-peer networks.
In [2]-[6], fixed values of reputation thresholds have been
selected to discriminate cooperative from noncooperative
nodes. However, such static values may not be suitable
for every ad hoc environment. In this paper, we integrate
a reinforcement learning technique with an existing rep-
utation scheme and determine a good rule to distinguish
malicious. The advantage of our approach is that the rule
is adaptive to the network dynamics because it is learned
by interacting directly with the environment.
II. REPUTATION AS A REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
PROBLEM
Reinforcement learning is a computational approach for
goal-directed learning and decision-making. It uses a for-
mal framework defining the interaction between a learning
agent and its environment in terms of states, actions and
rewards. Figure 2 shows the agent-environment interac-
tion in reinforcement learning. In this paper, we employ
a learning approach based on sample episodes, called the
on-policy Monte Carlo (ONMC) method [8]. This method
uses sample episodes for estimating value functions which
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Fig. 2. Diagram of agent-environment interaction in reinforcement
learning.
Initialize, for all s E Xs, a E As
Q(s,a) +- arbitrary
Returns(s, a) e- empty list
z +- an arbitrary E -soft policy
Repeat forever:
(1) Generate an episode using z
(2) For each pair s, a appearing in the episode:
R <- return following the first occurrence of s, a
Append R to returns (s, a)
Q(s, a) <- average(Returns(s, a))
(3) For each s in the episode:
a +- arg max, Q(s, a)
For all aEAs :
I £
,IA lI
If a=a*
If a#a*
Fig. 3. The E-soft policy ONMC algorithm.
a route search to a destination node, and terminates when
the target node is found or the maximum number of hop
count is reached. As the route search is executed, the in-
termediate nodes are selected hop-by-hop based on their
reputation value. Each time the search is successful, a re-
ward is to every node along all paths found. The goal
is to find a rule that selects neighboring nodes based on
their reputation values, which optimizes some performance
criterion in finite horizon. The finite horizon problem is
considered here due to the episodic inature of route search
process.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The ONMC method can be applied to an actual ad
hoc network or a simulator to obtain a good neighbor-
ing node selection policy. Consider a K-node ad hoc
network. Each source node S, maintains the reputation
information to all its neighboring nodes. Suppose that
nodes A, B, C, D are neighbors of node S. Let rA,
rB, rc, rD be the reputation of nodes A, B, C, D , re-
spectively, where 0 < rA,rB,rc,rD < 1. The reputation
scheme is based on [1], [2]. Since the reputation values
are real numbers, we quantize the state space at node S
as Xs {xs [qA,qB, qc, qD]} where qA,IqB, qc,IqD are
quantized reputation values of nodes A, B, C, D , re-
spectively. Let the action space at node S be given by
As ={as: [6A,6B,6C,6D]} where &A (6B, EC, 3D) is the
1 if node S selects node A (B, C, D ) in the route search
and 0, otherwise. The process is repeated at every selected
nodes until the destination node is found or the maximum
number of hop counts is reached. If the route search is suc-
cessful, then a reward of +1 is assigned to every node on
all successful paths. Otherwise, a reward of 0 is assigned
to all nodes involved in the route search. By using the
ONMC method in this scenario, we are able to determine
a near-optimal neighboring node selection policy based on
reputation values.
quantify an agent's experience. Value functions are func-
tions of states or state-action pairs that estimate how good
it is for the agent to be in a given state or state-action pair.
Such functions are computed from average sample returns
received from the environment operating under a fixed
policy. The experience from the environment is divided
into episodes, and it is assumed that each episode termi-
nates eventually irrespective of whatever actions are taken.
The ONMC method learns incrementally on an episode-by-
episode basis--meaning that the value functions are esti-
mated and policies are improved after each episode. Under
certain assumptions, the ONMC method eventually con-
verges to an optimal policy and optimal value functions-
given only sample episodes and no other knowledge of the
environment's dynamics. Figure 3 shows the pseudo code
for the ONMC algorithm.
This method is selected because the episodic nature of
route search process in wireless ad hoc networks. An
episode starts immediately when a source node initiates
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We consider a wireless ad hoc network of 23 nodes which
includes a number of misbehaving nodes. Two cases of
topologies have been considered, i.e., the static and dy-
namic topology. In the latter case, the topology of the net-
work is generated by a random connectivity model. Rep-
utation values between 0 and 1 at each node reflects how
trustworthy of a node is-the higher the reputation values,
the more reliable the nodes are. Since reputation values
are continuous-valued, the state space is quantized into 5
subintervals, [0,0.2), [0.2,0.4), [0.4,0.6), [0.4,0.6), [0.6, 0.8)
and [0.8, 1) which are represented by integers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
respectively. Hence, the state space for a give node s has a
total of 54 = 625 possible states and for instance, the state
XS = [1, 3, 2,1] refers to the state when node s has neigh-
bors with reputation values rA,rD E [0, 0.2),rB E [0.4,0.6),
rC E [0.2,0.4), etc.
We study three schemes, namely, reputation scheme with
a fixed reputation threshold of 0.5 [2], and reputation
scheme combined with the ONMC, and a shortest path
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Fig. 4. Accumulated reward per episode as a function of the number
of malicious nodes in the test network.
scheme which disregards the reputation values.
Figure 4 shows the accumulated reward per episode ob-
tained in static and dynamic topologies as the number of
malicious nodes in the network increases. The maximum
number of allowed packets broadcasted in the network is
1000. Under both topologies, the ONMC scheme outper-
forms the other two schemes as the number of bad nodes
increases. The reason is because ONMC can attain good
policies for avoiding malicious nodes and is able to find
more successful routes when compared to other schemes.
Note that when multiple successful paths are found, a re-
ward of + 1 is assigned to every node on all successful paths.
Therefore, the accumulated reward per episode of ONMC
is the highest among the schemes.
Figure 5 shows the number of packets arrived at the des-
tination in static and dynamic topologies as the number
of malicious nodes in the network increases. The maxi-
mum number of allowed packets broadcasted in the network
is 1000. Results show that the reputation with ONMC
scheme consistently gives the highest number of packets
under both topologies.
Figure 6 shows the relative throughput of the shortest
path and reputation with ONMC schemes (i.e., through-
put/throughput-reputationonly). Results show that the
reputation with ONMC scheme can achieve up to 89% and
29% increase in throughput for static and dynamic topol-
ogy case, respectively, as the number of malicious nodes
increase.
Figure 7 shows the percentage of packets that arrived at
the destination as a function of the maximum allowed num-
ber of packets. The number of malicious nodes is fixed at 5.
Results show that the reputation with ONMC scheme still
gives a significantly higher number of packet arrivals com-
pared to the other two schemes-even when we reduce the
amount of flooding (i.e., by reducing the allowable packets
in the network from 1000 to 10 packets).
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Fig. 5. The number of packets arrived at the destination as a function
of the number of malicious nodes in the test network.
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Fig. 6. Relative throughput as a function of the number of malicious
nodes in the test network.
V. CONCLUSION
The ability to join the network on the fly without central-
ized infrastructure exposes wireless ad hoc networks to ma-
jor security vulnerabilities. Secure network functionalities
are therefore necessary to defend attacks from malicious
nodes. In this paper, we study a reputation scheme com-
bined with ONMC method to learn good rules to identify
and therefore select behaving nodes as well as avoid ma-
licious nodes. Numerical studies show that up to 89% of
throughput increase can be achieved over the fixed thresh-
old reputation scheme-showing that learning through di-
rect interaction with the network can lead to better repu-
tation decision rules.
291
20
20
550
o e Dynamic topology reputation with threshok
m 500 . Dynamic topology ONMC with reputation
-e- Static topology reputation with threshold
450
--- Static topology ONMC with reputation
(D 400
53250
300 -
i 2
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 0C
Number of maximum allowed packets
Fig. 7. Percentage of packets that arrived at the destination as a
function of the maximum allowed number of packets.
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